September 3, 2026:
Since 1945, the Russian army has undergone seemingly continuous reform and anti-corruption efforts. Another one of those is now underway, again in response to the lackluster performance of Russian forces in Ukraine. One can see how the current reform efforts will plagiarize earlier ones.
Two years ago, a scandal led to the arrest of a Russian deputy defense minister. Then the ministry’s personnel directorate head was hauled into court. Within a few weeks, two more senior military officials were detained. All face corruption charges, which they have denied. The arrests began shortly before President Vladimir Putin started his fifth term, as longtime ally and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was demoted to a new job.
This immediately raised questions about whether Putin was reasserting control over the Defense Ministry amid the war in Ukraine, whether a turf battle had broken out between the military and the security services, or whether some other scenario was playing out behind the Kremlin’s walls. To many, this seemed to be a return to the Russian government long described as a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.
Corruption scandals are not new, and officials and top officials have been accused of profiting from their positions for decades. Corruption in Russia functions as both a carrot and a stick. It encourages loyalty and keeps people on the same page, while also serving as a tool of control. Putin favors men with embarrassing secrets when selecting key government officials. Trust those who have a secret they want kept secret. The Russian government constantly searches for such secrets so it can threaten to publicize them if the officials do not do as they are told. This hidden policy and tolerance for corruption are keys to how the current Russian government operates.
The war in Ukraine has led to much larger defense spending with the usual increased opportunities for graft. In April, the first official arrested for corruption was a former Deputy Defense Minister who oversaw high-priority military construction projects with access to large sums of money and few financial controls. One of the projects was rebuilding the devastated Ukrainian port city of Mariupol. The Ukrainians held out for a long time, and the Russians had to fight hard to capture a city of ruins, unusable factories, and port facilities.
The recent arrests are not described as part of an anti-corruption campaign but rather ongoing activities throughout the Russian government. That’s another way of admitting corruption was everywhere and ongoing, and an essential element of making the government work.
Key officials make little effort to hide their new wealth. They do this through ostentatious displays ranging from hundred-million-dollar yachts to new wristwatches that cost several times their official annual salaries. These displays of ill-gotten wealth by senior government and military officials and their family members were so extensive and obvious that it enraged Russians who were suffering economically because of the cost of the war.
There were more personal costs because at least half a million Russians have died in Ukraine since early 2022, and their families and friends blame the Russian government because it was Russia that invaded Ukraine, not the other way around. During World War II, the last time Russia was invaded, there was little corruption in part because 14.4 percent of Russians died in that war. Most of them were killed by the Germans, but many were killed by the Russian government.
Prompt obedience to orders was a matter of life or death for Russian soldiers and civilians because military officers and NKVD secret police personnel could kill any Russian displaying reluctance or refusal to carry out orders. The desperate situation during World War II limited opportunities for corruption. The war in Ukraine is different, but as many corrupt officials are discovering, not different enough to keep them out of prison or an early grave.
The recent arrests, prosecutions, and imprisonment of senior officials who were corrupt, or too obviously corrupt, have sent a message to all senior officials in jobs that give them access to the swollen defense budget, now 6.7 percent of GDP. Before the invasion, it was 3.6 percent. Putin thought the invasion would quickly overthrow the Ukrainian government. That did not happen, and the war's costs exceed what Russia can afford. This is nothing new; decades of spending 15 percent of GDP on defense and tolerating widespread corruption by senior officials led to the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. Many Russian economists and bankers believe another economic collapse, similar to what destroyed the Soviet Union, is possible unless the increased defense spending is restrained along with the growing corruption.
Fifteen years ago, the Russian Defense Minister caused a firestorm of bad publicity when he announced that Russia was shopping for foreign assault rifles and sniper rifles. This offended many Russians, who consider the AK-47, and all of its derivatives, to be perfectly suitable for Russian troops, and national icons as well. But the defense minister has a point. Professional soldiers prefer more accurate assault rifles, and Russia wants to create a more professional army. While the AK-47 was popular with irregulars and bandits, that's mainly because it was a rugged weapon that could survive a lot of abuse and neglect, and still fire. Not very accurately, but as amateurs often fired the AK-47 type weapon on full automatic, accuracy was beside the point. Russians also take pride in the fact that the AK-47 was the first modern assault rifle when it was introduced in 1947. That's not true either. A very similar weapon, the German Sturmgewehr 44 (also known as the MP43, MP43/1, MP44, and StG44), entered the Russian front in July 1943 and remained in production and use until 1945. The Russians had four years to examine captured Sturmgewehr 44s. Its resemblance to the AK-47 was no accident.
Meanwhile, Russia had implemented a five-year plan to spend $12 billion on Western weapons and weapons manufacturing technology. The most visible deals were with France to obtain four Mistral-class amphibious ships (that look like small aircraft carriers), another with Israel for drones, and yet another with Italy for wheeled armored vehicles. In particular, Russia wanted to obtain manufacturing technology. Russian companies have shown they can adapt to Western manufacturing methods and produce comparable goods in Russia with Russian staff. But Russia has long resisted doing this, legally, with military equipment. Now Russia wants to obtain Western technology and manufacturing techniques for designing and building better assault and sniper rifles.
At the beginning of this century, President Putin got the legislature to back one of his major military reforms: taking much of the military's control away from the generals and admirals. The Russian military high command has always had more authority than the Secretary of Defense has in America. Putin realized that the U.S. approach makes it easier to deal with corruption and incompetence if his defense minister had a say in things like training exercises, field operations, and domestic base inspections. Generals can no longer stonewall Defense Ministry queries with "it's a military matter that only the Chiefs of Staff have authority over." This response has been used frequently over the past decade to cover up military corruption and incompetence.
A bit later, the Russian armed forces underwent yet another round of reforms, including attempts to eliminate corruption and conscription. The Railway Troops and Special Construction Troops were brought back into the armed forces, bringing total troop strength to an alleged 1.2 million, plus 876,000 civilians. Volunteer troops were paid more and received better training and living conditions than conscripts. But a major reason for moving to an all-volunteer force is that so many young men avoided service (legally or otherwise). This was nothing new. At the end of the Cold War, only about a third of each year's 18-year-old males actually made it into military service.
Morale among officers and NCOs was also in trouble. So, pay for these career troops was increased. A major general received $541 a month, and a lieutenant $216. The changes also affected how career troops receive family housing and other benefits. The relative lack of these benefits produced a steady exodus of the best officers. Russia’s war with Ukraine, starting in 2014, made all this worse.